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“The question for Russia now is what to do next.  
How can we make the new, market mechanisms work to full capacity?  
How can we overcome the still deep ideological and political split in society?  
What strategic goals can consolidate Russian society?  
What place can Russia occupy in the international community in the 21st century?  
What economic, social and cultural frontiers do we want to attain in 10-15 years?  




-Vladimir Putin, “Millennium Manifesto,” December 29, 1999 
  
 Since becoming President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin 
(2000-2008; 2012—) and the ruling elite have attempted to mobilize the youth for political 
participation in support of the regime.  A number of pro-Kremlin youth organizations emerged in 
tandem with Putin’s accession to, and consolidation of, power.  My thesis explores the formation, 
development, and transformation of these pro-regime youth organizations in Russia from 2000 to 
2012, with a particular focus on Nashi (“Ours”), established by Kremlin officials in 2005.  As the 
most visible and influential politically-oriented youth organization to appear in Russia during 
this time period, Nashi was, for a time, a powerful symbol of patriotic youth activism and official 
state politics.  Along with my historical discourse on Nashi and the pro-Kremlin youth 
movement, I identified a set of youth groups whose activities aimed to oppose or undermine the 
personal figure and politics of Putin, and correspondingly, Nashi.  In doing so, I examined the 
divergence of political imperatives and competing interests between Nashi and the opposition 
youth movement that made youth politics specially contentious during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century.    
                                                 
1
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 I begin my thesis with a background and context chapter on the historical framework of 
youth mobilization in Russia with a discussion of the premier organization for young people in 
the Soviet Union, the Komsomol (1918-1991).  Given its similarities with the Komsomol in its 
organizational structure and mobilization tactics, Nashi struck a familiar chord with Russian 
society.  In my first chapter, I outline the earliest attempts by Putin’s regime to mobilize the 
youth with Nashi’s immediate predeccesor, Idushchie Vmeste (“Walking Together”).  In Chapter 
Two, I discuss the formation and development of Nashi from 2005 to 2008, when the 
organization underwent its largest growth in membership and gained explicit support from the 
Kremlin.  In my third chapter I examine the leadership and structural changes within Nashi in the 
context of the political transition from Vladimir Putin to Dmitry Medvedev as president from 
2008 to 2012.  In all three chapters I discuss the emergence of politically opposing youth groups 
and their efforts to undermine Nashi and the regime.  This thesis highlights especially the 
political and ideological challenges that undermined the viability and sustenance of Nashi in 
order to understand what place in current history organized youth movements have occupied 
within the larger scope of Vladimir Putin’s Russia.   
 I first became interested in Nashi through my earlier academic interests in the personal 
figure and politics of Vladimir Putin himself.  In particular, I was interested in the state- and 
nation-building processes of Putin’s Russia, and the seemingly paradoxical nature of the Russian 
state as both powerful and institutionally fragile.  As research assistant to Professor Elizabeth A. 
Wood at MIT’s History Department (January 2011 - May 2012), I conducted research on the role 
of gender and masculinity in Putin’s leadership.  In particular, I analyzed images of Putin taken 
between 2007 and 2011, when an increasing number of professionally photographed images 
captured him horseback riding through Siberia shirtless, driving a Harley Davidson motorcycle, 




putting out wildfires in Western Russia from a firefighting aircraft, and emerging from the Greek 
Black Sea in his scuba diving outfit with two ancient amphorae in each hand.  Such explicit 
displays of masculinity have boosted Putin’s popularity among Russians, especially among 
women, because the images reflect an image of a strong, capable, and disciplined leader.  In the 
process of conducting research for Professor Wood, I identified a number of Russian and 
Western news sources, including English versions of major Russian publications such as Ria 
Novosti, Itar-Tass, Vedomosti, Novaia Gazeta, Kommersant, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, The Moscow 
Times, the Kremlin website, and the president’s official website – putin.ru, most of which I 
consulted for my thesis research.  I also navigated the websites of the major youth groups I 
studied, including Nashi’s, which uses the suffix “.su” (Soviet Union) for its URL address.     
  My work was based primarily on government documents, speeches by the president and 
prime minister, media reports, and materials available online through government and 
institutional websites, blogs, social media websites, and online news sources.  Additionally, I 
selected a number of images to include in my thesis if only to highlight the great symbolic value 
that political youth movements held in Russia.  Finally, my research and analysis has been 
greatly supplemented by existing scholarship in books and journal articles on Nashi and the 
political history of Putin’s Russia.   
 












 As part of a multifaceted effort to consolidate power and maintain its political status quo, 
Putin’s government did what its Soviet predecessors had accomplished in the past – it attempted 
to rally the nation’s youth in support of its politics and ideology.  In the Soviet Union, youth 
organizations organized by the Communist Party had effectively monopolized almost all spheres 
of public youth activity.  During the 1920s and 1930s, as the new Communist regime was laying 
down its Marxist-Leninist foundations, a comprehensive youth program took shape that 
consisted of three separate but linked groups.  The youngest were the Octobrists, children aged 
seven to nine, who were next enrolled in the Young Pioneers until the age of fifteen, when they 
could apply to join the Komsomol.
2
  The All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League 
(VLKSM), universally known as the Komsomol,
3
 was officially formed on October 29, 1918 to 
enhance the Bolshevik Party’s centralized control over the young, as well as in response to the 
social, economic, and political problems confronting the newly-established Party.  Prior to 1917, 
neither the Bolsheviks nor the Mensheviks had maintained separate youth branches, since many 
young people had already joined both revolutionary parties and others such as the Socialist 
Revolutionary Party.
4
  The revolution of February 1917, however, gave rapid rise to the 
spontaneous formation of radical youth groups.  Fearing the potential instability and political 
                                                 
2
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Cambridge University Press, 1985), 47.  
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Molodezhi. 
4
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chaos these nascent youth groups might cause, the Bolsheviks began formulating their own youth 
branch.   
 When Bolshevik officials discussed the nature and structure of a proposed Communist 
youth league at Bolshevik Party meetings in July and August of 1917, the main challenge for 
them was determining the degree of control it would exercise over the new league.  While the 
majority of Bolshevik leaders feared the consequences of allowing a group of young radicals to 
function entirely independent of the Party, they also recognized that a strictly regimented youth 
league controlled by the Party might restrain mass membership.  Finally, in a resolution adopted 
by the Sixth Party Congress in August 1917, the Party announced its intention to create 
“independent organizations, not subordinated to the Party organizationally, but connected with it 
only in spirit.”5   The ambiguous meaning of “spirit” in this statement legitimated the Party’s 
occasional redefinition of the goals and structure of the Komsomol throughout the seventy-three 
years of the league’s existence.  As such, the institutional character of the Komsomol remained 
constantly in flux, responding to the needs of the Union’s leadership and to the changes 
occurring within Soviet society.   
 The history of the Komsomol can be divided into two distinct periods: before and after 
the Second World War.  In the years preceding the war, the youth organization was 
predominantly characterized by the political activism of young, radical communist enthusiasts 
who actively sought to promote the class struggle and topple the old power structures in society.
6 
 
According to Hilary Pilkington, the memoirs of Komsomol members seemingly contradicted the 
popular notion that young people were “coerced into the revolutionary movement,” and reveal 
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instead that most had been eager to join the Komsomol because it had offered them organized 
social activity, mobility in both education and employment, and an “appealing ideology of social 
justice.”7  Soviet thinkers in the 1920s and 1930s frequently defined the relationship between the 
Communist Party and the Komsomol in terms of mechanistic images in which the Party stood as 
the “engine” of society that would “provide the forces necessary for change and development,” 
while the ideas generated by this machine would come to the “masses” by “transmission belts,” 
or organizations such as the Komsomol.
8
  Therefore, the Komsomol was meant to convey and 
preserve Party ideals through active political and social participation among the younger 
generations.    
 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, under Joseph Stalin’s regime, the Komsomol 
successfully mobilized masses of young people to participate in large state construction projects 
around the country as part of the rapid industrialization initiatives of the Five Year Plan.
9
  The 
Komsomol’s ability to organize and dispatch large units of young, male “shock workers” to build 
massive power stations and new factories in parts of the Urals and Siberia made the organization 
a major source of manual labor for the Communist Party.
10
  By the late 1930s, however, the 
Komsomol had lost virtually all aspects of organizational independence and was subjected to 
Party purges.  From July 1936 to the end of 1938, Stalin’s regime conducted a widespread terror 
campaign, known as the “Great Purges,” to repress “former kulaks, active anti-Soviet elements 
and criminals,” according to Order No. 00447 executed on 30 July 1937 by the People’s 
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8
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9
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Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), the law enforcement agency of the Soviet Union.
11
  
The purges of 1937 decimated Komsomol leadership and membership ranks after a full-blown 
campaign to root out “enemies of the people within the Komsomol” was outlined in the Fourth 
Plenum of the Central Committee of the VLKSM (21-28 August 1937).
12
  It was not until a year 
later, in November 1938, when the Party ended the purges, that memberships were restored to 
surviving Komsomol activists and new recruits alike.   
 The Great Patriotic War (World War II, 1941-1945) saw a dramatic growth in Komsomol 
activities and enrollments, as wartime patriotism spurred millions of young people to join 
Komsomol organizations and the Red Army.  While the Komsomol continued growing during 
the war, the fighting took a great toll on its ranks.  In the postwar period, with the expansion of 
secondary and postsecondary education under Nikita Khrushchev, Komsomol membership in 
educational institutions increased dramatically.
13  
Meanwhile, Komsomol numbers continued to 
grow steadily as the Soviet youth program provided youth with opportunities to improve their 
social conditions through education, enhance their political mobility within the Party, and to 
participate in the Virgin Lands Campaign begun in 1953 by Khrushchev to increase agricultural 
production on uncultivated lands scattered across the Soviet Union.  By 1958, Komsomol 
enrollment soared to 18.5 million and by 1963 to 19.4 million.
14
  Thus, the Komsomol had 
become an increasingly powerful instrument of social control by allowing young people to 
participate in the state’s major industrialization projects, as well as serving as a political 
recruitment mechanism for the state through political training and ideological discipline.    
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 Yet, even as Komsomol membership continued to rise during the Khrushchev period, 
Soviet authorities were also confronted with the increasing problem of deviance, also known as 
“hooliganism.”  Although hooliganism had been a familiar form of deviance since the late 
nineteenth century and throughout the Stalin era, by 1958, it appeared to have become a unique 
problem that “surpassed all previous bounds.”15  In 1963 alone, one out of every twenty-five 
Soviet men between the ages of 18 to 40 was either arrested or charged in court for 
hooliganism.
16
  Young people across the Soviet Union began expressing discontent towards the 
Soviet leadership and its socialist policies after they were particularly inspired by the Hungarian 
Uprising of 1956, when thousands of students in Hungary demonstrated against the Soviet-
influenced government of the People’s Republic of Hungary.  KGB reports to the Central 
Committee indicated a significant rise in what authorities called “anti-Soviet phenomena,” which 
included anonymous and threatening letters to Party officials, and public, spontaneous outbursts 
of discontent against the government.  Subsequently, the Soviet Union would occupy Hungary 
until 1991.   
 The volume of dissent was also largely a result of Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” that he 
delivered to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party (CPSU) on February 1956, 
articulating the need for openness and public criticism in the post-Stalin era.
17
  The death of 
Joseph Stalin three years before had ushered in a new era of Khrushchev reforms with the intent 
of melting away an icy totalitarian past.  This period of liberalization was subsequently named 
“the thaw,” after a second-rate novella by Ilya Ehrenburg. 18   The combined impact of the 
                                                 
15
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Hungarian Uprising and the Secret Speech gave way to more young people engaging in acts of 
public dissent, or at least, what the authorities perceived as anti-Soviet behavior and propaganda.  
In the Soviet Union, the courts generally charged hooliganism as a crime and the state perceived 
hooligans as agents of resistance who posed a serious threat to the established Soviet order.  
Even within the Komsomol, dissent among the Communist Party’s youth wing seemed pervasive.  
According to a report dated 10 December 1956 sent to Vladimir Semichastnyi (a member of the 
Komsomol Central Committee at the time, and later, chairman of the KGB), it noted that “in 
some Komsomol branches an unhealthy atmosphere has appeared with mistaken views on life, 
speeches alien to Marxist-Leninist views and a tendency to think in bourgeois terms.”19  These 
official reports reflected the generational divide that had begun to emerge since the Twentieth 
Congress, as more young people expressed resentment towards the generation before them that 
had “either participated in the abuses of the Stalin years or had remained silent in order to protect 
themselves.”20  The percentage of convicted hooligans who were Komsomol members increased 
from 5 percent in 1947 to 9 percent in 1961.
21
  Despite the fact that more Komsomol members 
committed hooliganism over this period, they still remained a small presence among convicted 
hooligans.   
 Besides hooligans, the stiliagi consisted of a separate, but related, category of individuals 
whose nonstandard styles and forms of self-presentation the state had deemed to be another form 
of deviancy.   The stiliagi was the first non-Komsomol cultural youth group to emerge in the 
postwar period during the late 1940s.  Komsomol secretary A.N. Shelepin in 1954 described the 
stiliagi as “young men with Tarzan haircuts (tarzan‘iepricheski), dressed up like parrots” who 
                                                 
19
 Robert Hornsby, “Political Protest and Dissent in the Khrushchev Era,” (PhD diss., University of Birmingham, 
2008), 69.   
20
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neither worked nor studied, but loitered on the “streets of Moscow, Leningrad, Tbilisi, Erevan, 
and several other cities.” 22  At the conclusion of his observation, Shelepin wonders, “What kind 
of people are they?”  The crude description of young stiliagi men by Shelepin made a clear 
reference to the group’s radical style (stil’), which had generally consisted of the men wearing 
bright-colored shirts, flared trousers, outgrown hair, and an air of disaffection that went along 
with their seemingly dissipated lifestyle.  The stiliagi mainly consisted of sons of the Stalinist 
elite who decidedly chose to live in this “un-Soviet manner,” in reaction to the form of 
masculinity linked to frontline experience that had dominated the postwar gender discourse in 
the Soviet Union.
 23
  According to Mark Edele, for men who had been too young or otherwise 
unable to fight in the war, their inability to fight had “robbed” them of this crucial source of 
masculine identity that in turn had elevated the social status of those who did serve at the front, 
the frontoviki.
24
   The war veteran’s classic masculinity was virtually impossible for these young 
men to imitate because a core feature of this masculinity included recounting wartime exploits, 
which was only possible to do for one who actually experienced and fought in the war.  Instead, 
the stiliagi imitated what seemed to them to be more viable and accessible – Western clothing, 
which had been brought from the West by veterans themselves.  Thus, the stiliagi established 
their own dominant form of masculinity by means of stylish dress, and radicalizing it to such an 
extent that it became “the core of an alternative form of manliness.”25   Inspired by Western 
dance and clothing, the stiliagi fashioned for themselves a colorful ensemble of wide trousers, 
patterned ties, and broad-shouldered jackets, all while dancing to “the fox-trot, the tango, the 
                                                 
22
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rumba, the lindy-hop, or the self-made dance called the “stiliagi tse-dri” which consisted of 
“terribly complex and ridiculous movements.”26  
 For Soviet authorities, who saw the potential for the group to become an “alternative 
avant-garde of youth to the Komsomol,” the stiliagi posed a serious challenge to Soviet ideology, 
“not because they were numerous or powerful, but because they were the first manifestation of a 
new phenomenon for which the country was ideologically unprepared.”27  In the context of the 
Cold War, the Party conceived the youth as primary targets of Western subversion and anti-
Sovietism.  Thus, Komsomol “brigades” were established to crack down on the stiliagi, 
ridiculing the young people in the satirical journal Krokodil
28
 and in the cities, forming patrol 
groups that reportedly went around cutting the trousers and the hair of local stiliagi.  Pilkington 
also points out that the Communist Party took full advantage of the “youth-as-victims-of-
Western-influence” paradigm to reinforce the idea among youth that, as constructors of 
communism, they remained integral to the future of the young socialist state.  Between 1955 and 
1966 it was estimated that 500,000 Komsomol youth were sent to the so-called ‘Virgin Lands’ of 
the Urals, Kazakhstan and western Siberia on state agricultural projects to build the foundations 
of communism by their own labor.
29 
  Hence, the 1950s and 1960s were a period of greater 
intellectual and cultural freedom that saw the growing influence of the stiliagi culture.  At the 
same time, it was a period of “renewed commitment to ideological unity and purity,” that 
significantly expanded the scope and membership of the Komsomol.
30
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 The stiliagi were only part of a wider cultural phenomenon affecting youth behavior in 
the Soviet Union and in Western Europe.  Nowhere was the reaction to American popular culture 
stark as in divided Germany.  In East Germany, authorities claimed that American music and 
film imports were destroying German cultural heritage and “‘barbarized’ both East and West 
German adolescents,” while in West Germany, already by the late 1950s city officials were 
opening jazz clubs for adolescents.
31
  American influences in the form of “young rebel” movies 
featuring actors like Marlon Brando, James Dean and Sidney Poitier, and rock ‘n’ roll music 
increased the anxiety of parents and government authorities, who were witnessing a dramatic, 
and often, rebellious change in young people’s behaviors.  The youth riots in East and West 
Germany from 1955 to 1959 only highlighted what many alarmingly viewed as the growing 
influence of trends linked to consumption and sexuality.
32
  Soviet authorities especially eyed 
American culture, and youth absorption of it, as potential “sources of resistance,” as well as 
important forces in changing gender mores in Soviet and Western European societies.
33
   The 
influence of rock ‘n’ roll, for example, presented a moral dilemma for authorities who viewed 
the behavior of female fans at dances and concerts as alarming proof of the disintegration of 
traditional norms of female respectability in society.  Dance styles in which men traditionally led 
and women followed dramatically changed with rock ‘n’ roll, as more “open dancing” made it 
possible for girls to dance independently without a male partner or with other girls.  As a result 
of breaking away from traditional norms in this manner, American culture contributed to the 
redefinition of gender roles in the Soviet Union.     
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 According to Steven Solnick, the Komsomol under Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev 
had attempted to reinforce two main tasks that in previous decades had been the focus for the 
Komsomol: the indoctrination of the youth both politically and ideologically, and the 
mobilization of large numbers of young people to meet specific economic and military needs.
34
   
Khrushchev especially sought an active Komsomol that promoted mass membership by 
emphasizing the latter approach, while Brezhnev had wanted the central work of the Komsomol 
to be the indoctrination of young people, and highlighted the former approach.
35
   In 1957, 
Moscow hosted one of the most widely attended International Youth Festivals organized by the 
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY).  According to the WFDY,
 
34,000 young 
people from 131 countries attended the Festival in Moscow, where they celebrated jazz music 




  By embracing popular music and contemporary works of 
art, the International Youth Festival symbolized a departure, albeit temporarily, from Soviet 
socialist realism.   
 Under Brezhnev (1964-1982), the relatively liberal measures of his predecessor’s cultural 
“thaw” were countered by a move towards increasing the militarization of the youth with the 
support of the Soviet army.  In 1967, the Law on Universal Military Obligation reduced the term 
of military service for draftees, but it also mandated a Basic Military Training program for boys.  
The “military-patriotic education” program sought to educate and train future army recruits as 
soon as they entered primary school.
38
  By second grade children were familiar with civil defense 
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exercises, and by ninth grade, they knew how to “disassemble, assemble, and fire an automatic 
rifle.”39  The program was created in a way such that by 1983, almost all 4.3 million men in the 
Soviet conscript army had been trained in military tactics, weapons, discipline, and patriotic 
ideology since childhood.   
 In March 1985, upon succeeding to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party, 
Mikhail Gorbachev launched a campaign for the restructuring of the Soviet economy 
(perestroika), followed by a campaign for openness in public expressions of opinions (glasnost).  
Both reform campaigns brought about economic and social changes in the USSR on an 
unprecedented scale.  Despite wanting to advance his reforms with socialism intact, Gorbachev 
had unforeseeably initiated a historic shift in Soviet economics from state socialism to partial 
free-market capitalism, and had thus paved the way for Boris Yeltsin’s capitalist initiatives in the 
first half of the 1990s.   
 During the early stages of glasnost, informal groups (neformal’nie ob”edineniia) of 
people who wished to express their own views and opinions in the public sphere, flourished.
40 
 
Gorbachev encouraged the creation of these alternative cultural formations, collectively known 
as the neformaly, with the goal of generating support for the Party leadership’s reform efforts.  In 
1989, there were almost 60,000 neformaly groups in the USSR, and by the summer of 1990, 
there were an estimated 90,000.
41
  Independent clubs were largely organized by young people 
with a variety of interests in music, dance, sports, and politics.  By 1988, however, a number of 
them began challenging the one-party system by demanding radical political change, such as the 
establishment of free trade unions, new pension and consumer-protection laws, and the 
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elimination of special privileges for the Communist party elite.
42
  As such, these informal 
organizations had the reverse effect on the leadership; rather than supporting Gorbachev’s 
reforms within the Party umbrella, they instead posed a threat to the Party by questioning its 
policies and seeking more radical action. 
 The growing influence of the neformaly led to “speculation about the possible 
transformation of the Komsomol from a political organization enmeshed in the structure of the 
Soviet state into an umbrella organization of interest-based clubs.”43  The Komsomol, too, began 
its own restructuring and refinement phase at this time.  During the Twentieth Congress of the 
VLKSM (Young Communists League) in April 1987, Party leaders amended its statues 
regarding the Komsomol’s position so that it was no longer a “social organization embracing the 
wide mass of progressive youth” but a “socio-political organization embracing the advanced 
section of youth.”44  This amendment indicated the Party’s choice in shifting the Komsomol’s 
position from serving as a mass organization to a small, political avant-garde for the youth.  By 
1991, however, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Komsomol had dissolved, leading to a 
new phase in political youth policy under President Boris Yeltsin.  The major federal youth 
policy to emerge out of the 1990s was a program entitled “The Youth of Russia,” which in 1997 
broadly defined the role of youth organizations and addressed the issue of juvenile crime.
45
   
However, no major youth movement had emerged during the immediate post-Soviet period in 
the first half of the 1990s.    
 Nashi, as proven by the long history of the Komsomol, emerged from a long-standing 
tradition of state-sponsored youth programs in the Soviet period.  The Komsomol had been a 
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Communist Party youth project created to indoctrinate the younger generation with Marxist-
Leninist ideology and to prevent the formation of independent youth groups that might challenge 
the official order.  Similarly, Nashi was a Kremlin project, but one that was specifically created 
to mobilize support around the figure and politics of Vladimir Putin.  Nashi’s close relationship 
with Putin and the Kremlin served as the backbone of the movement.  Unlike the Communist 
Party, which had Marxist-Leninism as a source of ideological unity and identity from which 
members of the group could act collectively, it seemed as though the Kremlin in the 2000s had 
virtually no other viable source from which pro-regime youth organizations could gather its 





















Idushchie Vmeste, 2000-2005 
 
 
 On December 29, 1999, on the eve of his ascension to the acting presidency, Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin published a blueprint for Russian policy that became known as the 
“Millennium Manifesto.”  In it he expressed his conviction that ensuring Russia’s prosperity over 
the course of the new millennium would be not only an economic and political problem, but also 
an “ideological, spiritual and moral problem.”46  Although adamantly opposed to the adoption of 
an “official state ideology” (unconstitutional under Article 13 of the 1993 Russian 
Constitution),
47
  Putin argued that the “Russian idea,” a national project initiated by his 
predecessor Boris Yeltsin in 1996 to define the core values of the Russian polity, needed to be 
realized in order to ensure Russia’s revival and prosperity as a “great power.”  The process of 
revitalizing the nation and state seemed all the more pressing to Putin in the aftermath of the 
destabilizing events of the 1990s which included the war in Chechnya, 1994-1996, the mass 
privatization of industrial enterprises and the subsequent rise of a cohort of oligarchs, and the 
economic chaos following the collapse of the ruble in August 1998.  At the core of this “Russian 
Idea” were what he deemed traditional Russian values: patriotizm [patriotism], derzhavnost’ 
[great-powerness], gosudarstvennichestvo [state-centeredness], and solidarnost’ [solidarity].48  
These values, asserted Putin, were tied to the belief that a strong state was “the source and 
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guarantor of order, the initiator and the main driving force of any change” and that society 
desired “the restoration of the guiding and regulating role of the state.”  Instead of advocating for 
an ideology,
49
 Putin’s words strongly emphasized the need for a consensus of values, or “social 
accord,” and like any leader of a political system, he was guided by a set of assumptions and 
values that influenced his political decision-making.
50
  The values he outlined in his Millennium 
Manifesto (patriotism, great-powerness, state-centeredness, and solidarity) would serve as the 
ideological underpinnings of his leadership, aimed at achieving an internal social and political 
consistency.  Therefore, Putin deftly steered the political discourse away from the Soviet 
emphasis on ideology and towards a system of universal and traditional values that outlined a 
reformed view of contemporary Russian state and society.   
 Putin’s first presidential term, 2000-2004, was primarily focused on state-building.  His 
initial efforts to rebuild the state proceeded in three major stages: the restructuring of the Duma 
through a series of reforms in 2001 and 2002, the reining in of the oligarchs beginning in 2003, 
and the restoration of central authority over regional governments in 2004.  Putin was especially 
intent on establishing direct control of the regional governments, which had grown tremendously 
after the rapid decentralization of the 1990s.  A week after taking his presidential oath, Putin 
confirmed the enforcement of a law that consolidated the country’s political administrative 
framework into seven federal districts.
51
  This recentralization of power under Putin meant that 
power ministries at the regional level would now be subject to Moscow.   
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 The ongoing war in Chechnya, which had been launched in 1994 by Yeltsin, provided a 
primary justification for political centralization.  The independence movement in Chechnya and 
its growing terrorism against Russia was indicative of Russia’s weak central government.  The 
Russian government feared that the Chechen problem would spread to the rest of the North 
Caucasus region.  In September 1999, four apartment buildings in Moscow were bombed, killing 
more than 300 people and injuring hundreds more.  The Russian government blamed Chechen 
terrorists for the Moscow bombings, and used that assertion as a partial pretext for launching a 
second military campaign against Chechnya.
52
  Critics, however, claimed that the Russian 
security services, not the Chechens, were responsible for the bombings as part of a Kremlin 
machination to promote public support for Putin, the newly appointed premier who was a 
relatively unknown former KGB agent at that time.  Subsequently, the Moscow bombings had 
bolstered support not only for the war, but also for then Prime Minister Putin, whose tough 
stance against Chechnya won significant support among the Russian population after he 
famously pronounced this threat to Chechen guerrillas: ''If we catch them in the toilet, we will 
rub them out in the outhouse.''
53
  Thus, Putin’s tough stance and brute language on Chechnya 
helped him gain popularity at home, in time to win the presidential elections the following year.  
His approval ratings jumped from 31 percent in August 1999, before the military conflict broke 
out in Chechnya, to 80 percent that November, and would remain at an average of 70 percent 
throughout much of his first term in office.
54
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 Against this backdrop of politics, war, and Putin’s popularity, the ruling elite agreed to 
support a young official from the Presidential Administration, Vasily Yakemenko (b. 1971) and 
his brother Boris, in founding the youth organization, Idushchie Vmeste (“Walking Together”) in 
May 2000. According to Yakemenko, Idushchie Vmeste was intended to fill a “moral and 
cultural vacuum” that had previously been filled by groups like the Young Pioneers or the 
Komsomol.
55
  At its core, the newly formed organization would concentrate its activities on 
promoting patriotic education and forming spiritual, moral, and physically strong youth, in 
addition to promoting a democratic society.    
 The main text of Idushchie Vmeste, the “Moral Codex,” was strikingly reminiscent of the 
Communist Party’s “Moral Code of the Builder of Communism” formulated in 1961, which had 
outlined specific rules that members of the Party were expected to follow.
56
  Jussi Lassila 
illustrates how, in many parts of the Codex, the ideals prescribed to a member of Idushchie 
Vmeste were almost the exact same as those outlined in the Communist Party’s Moral Code.  
They included: “the feeling of patriotism,” “high morals,” “political maturity,” and a “high level 
of cultural consciousness.”57  Additionally, the first set of commandments outlined in the “Moral 
Codex” included showing respect for elders and forswearing drugs, alcohol, and foul language.  
The emphasis on proper individual behavior reflected the group’s belief that “there are no bad 
nations – there are bad people.”58   In an effort to form educated and responsible citizens, 
therefore, members of Idushchie Vmeste were required to “attend six concerts or plays a year, 
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visit four historic cities, check out six books from the library and volunteer at least once a month 
at orphanages or senior citizen homes.”59  By fulfilling these duties, the creators of Idushchie 
Vmeste presumed that members would cultivate an appreciation for Russia’s Soviet past and 
generate patriotic feelings that would enable them to participate more willingly in the state- and 
nation-building initiatives of Putin and his regime.    
 Correspondingly, members were encouraged to actively recruit among their peers with 
promises of rising through the organization’s ranks.  Members were divided into groups of five 
called “red stars,” each led by a “foreman” who received a free pager and a small stipend for 
their services.  In turn, each of his/her five “soldiers” received free T-shirts.  Once members had 
a red star, they were encouraged to persuade another 50 to join, and if they got another thousand 
to join, they would be promoted to “coordinator.” 60   By 2002, Idushchie Vmeste had an 
estimated 50,000 members of whom 80 percent were students.
61
  Without a cohesive ideology, 
the organization’s attempts to attract membership by offering material incentives ultimately 
proved unsustainable.   
 The group’s recruitment and indoctrination methods together prompted critics of the 
organization to compare it to the Komsomol and the Hitler Youth, designating it the nicknames 
“Putinomol” and “Putin-Jugend.”62   The word play on Putin’s name furthermore reflected the 
views that Idushchie Vmeste was established by the Kremlin to form a “cult of personality” 
around Putin as part of a wider initiative to promote his image and gain support for him among 
the Russian populace.  What started as a Kremlin-engineered move by Vladislav Surkov to 
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promote Putin’s face on billboards, televisions, and newspapers in Moscow turned into a 
booming commercial market all throughout Russia with Putin’s face adorning “znachki [pins], 
coins, cakes, countless T-shirts, salt shakers, posters, postcards, playing cards, notebooks, and 
calendars.”63  Putin had repeatedly denied personally invoking a cult of personality and even 
denounced it as an indication of “repression” in reference to the term being highly associated 
with Stalin and his well-groomed cult of personality.
64
  Yet about a year into his first term, Putin 
fell short of disapproving the actions of his fans, citing his powerlessness in preventing them 
from publicly supporting him: “I understand that when somebody does such things, he or she is 
probably guided by the best of intentions, and that he or she thinks well of me.  I would like to 
thank them, but ask them not to do this.  [But] I cannot actively stop this.”65  Regardless, Putin 
continued to enjoy tremendous popularity; in 2002, a pop song titled “I want a man like Putin” 
hit music charts all across Russia.  Sung by the female duo Poyushchie Vmeste (“Singing 
Together”), the techno-pop song lamented an abusive, alcohol-drinking boyfriend and extolled 
Putin as the ideal Russian man: 
My boyfriend is in trouble once again: 
Got in a fight, got drunk on something nasty 
I’ve had enough and I chased him away 
And now I want a man like Putin 
 
One like Putin, full of strength. 
One like Putin, who won’t be a drunk 
One like Putin, who wouldn’t hurt me 
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The lyrics were written by a former press secretary of the Russian Supreme Court who denied 
any link between Poyushchie Vmeste and Idushchie Vmeste after a number of media 
commentators noted the striking similarity of the two names.
67
  Although the song popularized 
Putin as a symbol of true Russian masculinity, it also carried political overtones by commenting 
on Putin in his leadership role: 
 
I’ve seen him on the news last night 
He was telling us that the world has come to crossroads 
With one like him, it’s easy to be home and out 





Putin’s attraction, therefore, was not limited to his persona, but was intrinsically linked to his 
presidential power.  Idushchie Vmeste not only operated within this Putin-as-celebrity culture, 
but even benefited from Putin’s popularity as the “pro-Putin” youth organization.   
 Idushchie Vmeste, however, did not appear to be the only example of attempts by the 
ruling elite to bring back certain traditions and symbols from the Soviet period.  In 2000, Putin 
restored the music of the old Soviet anthem as the official anthem of the Russian Federation, 
prompting media speculation that Putin’s efforts to create a “strong, effective” state had a 
“distinctively reddish hue of the past.”69  Similarly, the armed forces adopted the communist-
style red banner as its official standard and Parliament approved the “imperial double-headed 
eagle as the state’s coat of arms and the pre-revolutionary tricolor as the national flag.”70  In 
2001, the Defense Ministry reintroduced compulsory military training in high schools as a 
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critical aspect of “military patriotic education” for Russian youth.71   The gosudarstvennichestvo 
(state-centeredness) Putin spoke of in his Millennium Manifesto appeared to have a fundamental 
role in the official adoption of these practices and symbols from the imperial and Soviet past.   
 Idushchie Vmeste was officially registered as a public organization on July 14, 2000, but 
only became known to the broader public in May 2001 when an estimated 10,000 young people 
gathered in Red Square to celebrate the first anniversary of Putin’s presidency.  The boisterous 
crowd of young people chanting “Russia” and “Putin” and wearing T-shirts emblazoned with 
Putin’s face was only a preview of the many pro-Putin rallies that were to come under his 
continued leadership.  On November 7, 2001, Idushchie Vmeste organized a nation-wide event 
called the “General Cleaning of Russia,” where 46 thousand young people in 50 cities 
participated in picking litter off the streets.
72
  The event served primarily as an opportunity for 
Idushchie Vmeste to support Putin publicly as members held signs that read “The President – the 
hope of Russia,” and “Youth for President.”  In this regard, the social actions of Idushchie 
Vmeste were symbolic; by endorsing Putin while engaging in “cleaning” the streets of Russia, 
the organization made it clear to the general public that its activities were linked to the power of 
Vladimir Putin.    
 Idushchie Vmeste also focused its activities in what Vasily Yakemenko described as 
“purifying Russian literature.”73  In the summer of 2002, Idushchie Vmeste conducted a “book 
exchange” on the streets in Moscow.  Members of the public were encouraged to turn in modern 
“liberal” books, which portrayed the difficulties of modern Russian life, in exchange for books 
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on the Red Army’s “glorious victories” during the Great Patriotic War.74  In particular, the group 
launched a protest campaign against the writer Vladimir Sorokin to condemn his 1999 book Blue 
Lard, which in one scene featured a clone of Khrushchev sodomizing a clone of Stalin.
75
  
Idushchie Vmeste filed an obscenity suit against Sorokin on the grounds that he was 
disseminating pornography.  In June 2002, members of Idushchie Vmeste staged a protest in 
front of the Bolshoi Theatre, ripping out pages from Blue Lard and then throwing them into a 
cardboard toilet.  In another instance, the organization held a public book-burning ceremony, 
burning works by writers whom the group deemed unpatriotic.  These activities by members of 
Idushchie Vmeste demonstrated the organization’s apparent strict adherence to moral values.  
Their actions reflected a patriotism that had its roots deeply embedded in the Soviet past, when 
the emphasis on reading books was largely a matter of also denouncing works of literature that 
went against the moral values and political views of the Communist Party.  Furthermore, 
Idushchie Vmeste’s denunciation of Sorokin’s book was, in part, a reflection of the group’s close 
ties with the Russian Orthodox Church.  The moral and conservative values upheld by Idushchie 
Vmeste seemed to echo Russian Orthodox teachings.     
 Despite its adherence to these values, Idushchie Vmeste found itself embroiled in a 
scandal in 2004 when a leading official of the group was caught distributing pornography.  
Around the same time, financial disputes had arisen between the St. Petersburg and Moscow 
branches of the organization, further disabling the organization.  In addition to these issues, 
Idushchie Vmeste was confronted with the growing presence of opposition youth groups.  On  
January 5, 2005, 21-year old Mikhail Obozov launched an anti-Kremlin youth group called 
Idushchie Bez Putina (“Walking without Putin,” a twist on name of the pro-Putin youth group) in 
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St. Petersburg.  As Robert Horvath notes, “[U]nlike more traditional youth movements 
sponsored by political parties, Idushchiye Bez Putina was a product of the Internet.”76  Obozov 
had been inspired to found Idushchiye Bez Putina after an online discussion with active-thinking 
youth who unanimously reached the conclusion that “it was time to move from the virtual world 
to the real one,” and that it was “time to go out onto the streets” and voice their demands to the 
authorities.
77
   Similarly, the group’s online manifesto “exhorted students to join the opposition 
to Putin, ‘a president who treats us like cattle.’”  While Obozov did not advocate a revolution per 
se, he alluded to the recent events that had sparked colored revolutions in former Soviet states by 
declaring, “It’s time to say ‘ENOUGH!’”  The phrase combined references to Ukraine’s Pora 
(“it’s time”) and Georgia’s Kmara (“Enough!”).78  As Robert Horvath recently noted in his work 
on the spectre of velvet revolution in Russia, the manifesto’s seditious language was further 
enhanced by the fact that the website hosting it was swiftly deleted soon after being posted, 
inevitably giving rise to suspicions about official involvement in closing down the website.
79
   
 Yet even the name of the group, Idushchie Bez Putina, highlighted the fact that its 
founders included former members of Idushchie Vmeste.  There were several instances of 
disaffected youth who crossed party lines after harboring a personal sense of estrangement from 
Putin and his politics.  Twenty-eight year old Maria Baronova, a former Putin supporter who had 
opposed the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, gradually “outgrew” Putin after repeated incidents by 
the government, including the handling of the Beslan school hostage crisis in 2004.
80
  The 
opposition youth movement partially derived its legitimacy from activists like Baronova who had 
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formerly identified with the politics of Putin and the Kremlin, but underwent a political 
conversion that landed them on the opposite side of the official line.  As if to highlight their 
disaffection, Horvath notes, Yakemenko denounced them as “traitors” funded by rich Westerners 
like George Soros.
81
  Boris Nemtsov on the other hand, a veteran opposition figure, hailed the 
new group as not only a sign of rising demand for freedom among young people, but also a 
promising sign that Putin had ceased to be “fashionable,” referring to a popular move begun by 
thousands of Idushchie Vmeste members of wearing t-shirts with Putin’s portrait on them.82   
 Youth from a local cell of the Communist Party noticeably reversed this fashion 
statement when a group of approximately fifty young men staged a protest outside of Putin’s 
house in his hometown of St. Petersburg.  The protestors wore masks that strikingly resembled 
Putin and t-shirts that read “Vova! Go home!”, which referred to the diminutive form of Putin’s 
first name, “Vladimir.”  The informal use of Putin’s name combined with the imperative “Go 
home!” — as in Putin should exit politics — undermined the extensive PR campaign that Putin 
and his team had been forming since he came into power in August 1999.  In what must have 
been an ironic spectacle, policemen went after the young men to tear off their Putin masks.   
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Figure 1. Protestors wear Putin masks during a rally in 





 The symbolic retaliation of this kind not only sparked a political movement, but also an 
artistic one, as young protesters began more and more to use art as a means of disseminating 
anti-government messages.  Voina (“war”), a group of young street artists who specifically 
engaged in political protest art, had proven to be a pioneer in this art protest movement.  Since its 
founding in October 2005, it has had approximately 200 members participating in its actions.  
According to a website that raises awareness of the arrest of two Voina members, the group 
identifies itself as “anarchist,” and considers the regime its enemy.84  The Russian Investigative 
Committee of the Prosecutor’s Office publicly announced that Voina was “a left-wing radical 
anarchist collective whose central goal is to carry out PR actions directed against the authorities, 
and specifically against law enforcement officials with the aim of discrediting them in the eyes 
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of the public.”85  According to one of its leaders, Alexei Plutser-Sarno, Voina members vary 
politically and socially, ranging from anarchists to punks, socialists, and libertarians.
86
  Yet, what 
unites them is a common desire to express radical political views through art.  Voina’s artwork, 
known to be provocatively sexual, violent, and grotesque, has become a “symbolic weapon full 
of satire and laughter,” which no pro-Kremlin youth group has been able to compete with in 
terms of creativity and gaining mass public attention.  New groups like Idushchie Bez Putina and 
Voina positioned themselves as alternatives to Idushchie Vmeste and thus led to the weakening 
of its mobilization capabilities.   
 The growing presence of these groups reflected the general decline in public confidence 
in the government and its institutions by the end of Putin’s first term.  According to several polls 
that were carried out in 2005 by the independent Russian pollster, the Levada Center, 47 percent 
trusted in Putin, followed by 41 percent who trusted the Russian Orthodox Church, and 31 
percent the Russian Army.87  On the lower end of public trust were the security agencies at 25 
percent, the media at 24 percent, regional authorities at 17 percent, and the federal government at 
14 percent.    
 By the end of 2004, the combination of competitive youth organizations and bad press 
made it challenging for Idushchie Vmeste to mobilize and recruit new members.  Critics and 
sympathizers of the regime alike became increasingly skeptical of the group’s Soviet-inspired 
actions and indoctrination methods.  The scandal involving the dissemination of pornography, 
the financial disputes between the St. Petersburg and Moscow branches, and the growing threat 
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of opposition youth movements all contributed to the Kremlin’s decision to dissolve Idushchie 

























Nashi Emerges, 2005-2008 
 
 
“What is it ‘to be part of the movement’? 
Being part of the movement means going out into the streets. 
It means to tell a villain that he’s a villain. 




-Vasily Yakemenko, Former Nashi Leader  
Speaking to Nashi Commissars, 2009 
 
 
 In January 2005, thousands of pensioners took to the streets in cities across Russia to 
protest against a new law that abolished a wide range of social benefits and replaced them with 
cash payments.  It was the largest show of discontent in Russia since Putin became president in 
2000.  According to the independent Russian polling agency, the Levada Center, Putin’s 
approval rating, which had exceeded 70 percent for most of his 2000-2004 presidency, dropped 
to 65 percent that January, down from 79 percent exactly the year before.
89
  For Putin and his 
government, the demonstrations calling for his resignation and in some extreme cases, insisting 
on a revolution, confirmed what they perceived as an alarming trend that was spreading across 
Eastern Europe, and which had already brought about regime change in Serbia in 2000, Georgia 
in 2003, and Ukraine in 2005.  In all three countries, youth had played a significant role in 
mobilizing protestors, and in the case of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” in 2004, youth-
organized action had helped pro-Western presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko prevail in an 
election dispute.  Meanwhile, in Russia, pensioners and veterans staging street protests were 
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conspicuously joined by members of the youth branch of the opposition party, Yabloko.  Largely 
in reaction to these events, especially the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, the Kremlin established 
Nashi.   
 The Youth Democratic Anti-Fascist Movement “Nashi” (Molodezhnoe 
Demokraticheskoe Antifashistskoe Dvizhenie “Nashi”) was officially established on 15 April 
2005 by Kremlin officials.  Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s then Deputy Chief of Staff, devised Nashi 
to function as a mass youth organization that would become part of a larger effort to build a 
“following of loyal, patriotic young people” for Putin’s government and that would “defuse any 
youthful resistance” that might develop over the course of the 2008 election cycle.90  Therefore, 
the Kremlin’s strategists formed Nashi partly in apprehension of a potential “orange-like” 
scenario in Russia.  It became clearer, too, that Nashi would be the successor group to Idushchie 
Vmeste when its leader, Vasily Yakemenko, announced that he would become Nashi’s leader.   
 The creation of Nashi appeared to have been triggered in part by the regime’s desire to 
“prevent a repeat of the Ukrainian ‘Orange Revolution’ during the 2007-2008 electoral cycle in 
Russia,” but also to create a system that would enable its members to integrate themselves into 
the political elite and as such, would function as a career ladder for the regime’s future 
bureaucrats and leaders.
 91
  The movement was conceived entirely by the Kremlin and had the 
political backing from its highest officials including Putin himself, who had met with Nashi 
representatives on multiple occasions, and Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
Presidential Executive Office and Aide to the President, who had been heavily involved with 
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Nashi’s initial activities.92  Before assuming the leadership of Nashi, Vasily Yakemenko had also 
worked in the Kremlin for a brief period within the Presidential Administration in the 
Department for External Relations, where he developed ties to Surkov and Gleb Pavlovsky, a 
well-established figure in the Kremlin who had been instrumental in founding the pro-Putin 
United Russia party.
93
  Given its strong connections with Kremlin personnel and as a 
consequence, access to Kremlin funds, Nashi became the most visible and influential group of all 
the politically-oriented youth organizations to emerge during this time period. 
 Nashi, unlike its predecessor Idushchie Vmeste, sought to transform itself into a more 
structured, disciplined, and radical youth organization that could respond to the political and 
social threats facing the Putin regime in the aftermath of the colored revolutions.  It was easier 
for Nashi to stage rallies in a short period of time because it already had a cohort of Idushchie 
Vmeste members, including Vasily Yakemenko, at its disposal.  In that sense, Idushchie Vmeste 
never completely fragmented; rather, it was redefined under the new label of Nashi.  The newly 
formed pro-Putin youth movement had simply adopted a number of Idushchie Vmeste’s tactics, 
discarding the ones that happened to be more controversial, such as the “book exchange.”  
Whereas Idushchie Vmeste sought to mobilize youth by means of a cultural program through 
reading patriotic-themed books and visiting historic sites, Nashi centered its agenda on fighting 
domestic and foreign opposition, and promoting education and social action not only for cultural 
purposes, but for political ends.   
 As a Kremlin youth organization that was “imposed by adults,” to borrow from the same 
expression that sociologist Allen Kassof used for his observation on Soviet youth 
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  Nashi did not appear to function as an organization of or for the youth, but 
stood as an agency of the pro-Kremlin United Russia party and of Putin himself, established to 
resist internal and external opposition, as well as to prevent the formation of opposition youth 
groups in Russia by dominating the public sphere of youth activism.  Therein lay both the 
strength and weakness of Nashi.  In serving the interests of Putin’s regime, Nashi was accorded 
the political and financial backing of the Kremlin, and as a consequence, garnered the sources 
and vital institutional support needed to attract young Russians to the organization.  Yet, as a 
Kremlin creation, Nashi was constrained as a social movement.  Sociologists define social 
movements as consisting of “networks of informal interaction between a plurality of individuals, 
groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political and/or cultural conflict, on the basis of a 
shared collective identity.”95  Nashi, however, never fully functioned as an informal network; it 
was a formal organization of young people summoned by the Kremlin to work in tandem with 
the commitments and policies of the regime.  Instead of a shared and constituted collective 
identity conceived by youth activists themselves, Nashi’s identity was Kremlin-oriented and 
Kremlin-dictated.  Similarly, Nashi members were not united by a set of common beliefs or ideas 
so much as they were by their support of the personal figure and politics of Vladimir Putin.  
According to Yakemenko in a 2001 interview, a youth movement without Putin was “unrealistic,” 
because “any movement, especially a youth movement, needs certain things: there should be a 
leader, there should be an idol.”96  A youth movement whose identity was exclusively linked to 
that of Putin and his politics implied that Nashi’s fate was likewise dependent on the outcomes of 
the regime.  The Kremlin’s attempts at controlling all aspects of the activities and processes of 
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the pro-regime youth movement had ultimately created an artificial network, in which its 
viability and sustenance were determined by external decision-making.      
 In her work analyzing the political sustainability of Nashi, Maya Atwal explains that the 
Kremlin had viewed any form of independent political engagement by Nashi activists as a 
potential risk for generating a genuine political debate and accountability that would have been 
“anathema to the authoritarian ambitions driving Nashi.”  Instead, the Kremlin had encouraged 
“an aggressive patriotic solidarity amongst Nashi activists, which could be manipulated and 
directed against any perceived potential political rivals at the behest of the state.” 97   This 
particular form of “aggressive patriotic solidarity” was evident in Nashi’s manifesto, which 
stated that the organization was founded specifically for the purpose of forming an “anti-fascist 
movement” to fight a wide spectrum of regime-opposing groups broadly labeled as fascists, 
liberals, Westerners, communists, ultra-nationalists, and oligarchs.
98
   
 Vladislav Surkov, better known as the “gray cardinal” of the Kremlin for his behind-the-
scenes role in shaping the ideological and political framework of Russia from 1999 to 2011, was 
recognized as the mastermind behind Nashi.  It was Surkov who coined the famous phrase, 
“sovereign democracy” in 2006 to describe the Kremlin’s position on governing principles.  He 
defined the term at great length as a mode of political life in which the bearer of sovereignty and 
the sole source of power in Russia is its “multiethnic people” whose power, in the national 
context, could never be usurped.
99
  Surkov distinguished the two words as “standing for two 
different phenomena, with ‘sovereign’ denoting a country’s position in the outside world and 
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‘democracy’ being a method of organizing society and the state.”100  Basically, Surkov rejected 
the notion that there was only one type of democracy (i.e. American), and argued that each 
country should be able to determine its own form of governance.
101
 Surkov’s concept of 
sovereign democracy influenced Nashi significantly.  In its manifesto, the only works that Nashi 
cited were by Surkov.  Moreover, the language of the manifesto placed significant emphasis on 
the ideas of the Kremlin’s ideologue when it stated that “[T]he task of our generation is to defend 
the sovereignty of our country today, as it was defended by our grandfathers 60 years ago,” and 
went on to state explicitly that Nashi’s primary goal was to “preserve the sovereignty and 
integrity of Russia.”102 
 By the beginning of Putin’s second term in 2004, a marked shift in political rhetoric 
reflected the regime’s view of the nation as being deeply embedded in global competition, “the 
struggle for energy resources, attempts by some countries to restrict the sovereignty of other 
countries, ‘colored revolutions’” and more.103  According to political scientist Andrei Okara, the 
concept of sovereign democracy had grave implications for Russian politics.  First, it implied 
that the sources of legitimacy were to be found in Russia, not the West; and second, being the 
power-wielding force for Russia, the sovereign elite were the ultimate guarantors of Russia’s 
sovereignty and thereby the protectors of the nation within the context of globalization and other 
external threats.
104
  To that end, one of the Putin regime’s strategic responses to the colored 
revolutions spreading across Eastern Europe at the time was to create an organized movement 
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consisting of a segment of the population’s most active and politically unassertive members in 
order to affirm Russia’s status as a sovereign and functionally democratic nation.   
 Hence, the Kremlin creation of Nashi was inspired by the fear engendered by the 
Ukrainian Orange Revolution.  On November 22, 2004, a crowd of hundreds of thousands had 
gathered in Kiev’s Independence Square chanting “Razom nas bahato! Nas ne podolaty!” 
(“Together, we are many! We cannot be defeated!”).  Conspicuous election fraud had brought 
waves of people displaying the color orange, the color of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko’s 
campaign, to protest the election’s rigged results that had declared the incumbent, Viktor 
Yanukovich, to be the winner.  After hundreds of thousands of participants staged nonviolent 
protests to demand a revote, which took place on December 27th, Yushchenko was declared the 
victor.
105
   
 In Moscow, news of the defeat of the Kremlin’s favored Ukrainian presidential candidate, 
Viktor Yanukovich, did not bode well.  The Kremlin had invested much of its personnel and 
financial resources, including a team of Kremlin spin doctors, to help run Yanukovich’s 
campaign.
106
  A week before the first round of elections, Russian President Vladimir Putin had 
been promoting Yanukovich in lengthy interviews and press conferences.  The unexpected 
victory of Yushchenko, therefore, proved to be a “humiliating defeat for Putin.”107  Political 
scientist and Putin advisor Gleb Pavlovsky described the Orange Revolution at the time as a 
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“serious wake-up call for Russia,” warning that if Russia did not take greater strides towards 
strengthening its political system, revolution would be imminent.
 108
 
 Moscow took note of the influential participation of Ukrainian youth in the Orange 
Revolution.  Media images of “tens of thousands of photogenic youngsters in orange scarves” 
embodied the kind of youth, idealism and Western political influence that the Kremlin feared 
might inspire a similar popular uprising in Russia.
109
  Youth had already played a crucial role in 
bringing about regime change in the elections in Serbia (2000) and Georgia (2003).
110
  In the 
democratic revolutions of Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, the youth groups Otpor, Kmara, and 
Pora, respectively, had played a significant role in mobilizing protestors, organizing logistical 
support for the protests, and initiating the first wave of protests.  Altogether the creation of 
Russia’s youth movements was seen by political experts as the Putin government’s attempt to 
prevent a future Orange Revolution with its own ‘preventive counter-revolution.’111   
 Thus, in February 2005, the “Antifascist Democratic Youth Movement Nashi” was 
officially established with the approval of the regime.  Nashi, meaning “ours,” was followed by 
the creation of similar groups such as Molodaya gvardiya (“Young Guard”), which belonged to 
the pro-Putin party United Russia; Mestnye (“Locals”), a group endorsed by the Moscow region 
government that had launched an anti-immigrant campaign in the summer of 2007; and 
Grigorevtsy, a group affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church.
112
  Nashi, the largest and most 
notable of the groups, identified itself as a movement that supported Putin “not as an individual,” 
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but through his “political course of action.”113  Its primary goal as a movement was to mobilize 
Russia’s youth so as to advance the country’s efforts towards a sense of proprietorship in the 
state:modernization by instilling in them  
 
Our goal is to ensure that millions of young people take part in the process of modernization with 
our President and those who have inherited an ineffective bureaucracy from the past. We live 
here. The future of our country is our future too. The success of each one of us depends on the 






 The creation of Nashi helped to modify public opinion of post-Soviet Russia’s youth.  
During the 1990s and up until the end of Putin’s first term in 2004, the general public had 
perceived Russian youth as “apathetic and apolitical.”115  The Kremlin’s ability to mobilize 
young people through groups like Nashi had allowed it to intimidate political opposition groups 
while gaining the support of pro-Kremlin ones.  The group was used for breaking up opposition 
rallies and for confronting major threats against Putin’s regime.   In this way the purpose and 
uses of Nashi differed from its predecessor, Idushchie Vmeste; while the latter had focused on 
forming a tight web of support around Putin, often deemed a cult of personality by media 
commentators, Nashi was partly intended to address the threat of foreign groups and foreign 
money from taking root in Russia.  State sponsorship gave Nashi total legitimacy and allowed a 
minority of Russia’s population – the youth – to exercise tremendous political will in the public 
sphere.   
                                                 
113
 “Nashi Youth Movement: History & Manifesto,” trans., Danya Spencer and Michael Smeltzer, School of Russian 




 Michael Schwirtz, “Russia’s Youth,” Demokratizatsiya (2007): 74.  




 Running parallel to the official discourse centered on youth politics were the youth 
themselves, and their reasons for joining Nashi.  In the first instance, prospective members were 
beckoned with the following recruitment announcement on Nashi’s website: 
 
YOU 
do you want to realize your own project? 
do you want to change the world around you? 
do you want to influence the future of your country? 
do you want that the world would remember you? 
do you search your place in your life? 
You have a chance to change your life, influence the world politics, to come new intellectual 
elite 
Our people are already in the Public Chamber, political state organs and in the biggest Russian 
companies. 
 
Are you worth the higher education in our university with the best teachers of the country? 
Are you worth a traineeship in the company you want, in Russia, or abroad? 
Are you worth realizing your own project? 
Prove it! Fill the form! 





 This announcement suggested entrepreneurial independence, self-actualization, and the 
promise of a better, brighter future based on one’s own efforts, but only on the condition of 
joining Nashi.  The message also challenged readers to “prove” that they were “worth” certain 
privileges, such as a higher education, an internship, or a self-initiated project, by designating 
themselves supporters of the Putin government through joining Nashi.  To that end, this 
particular advertisement for recruiting potential Nashi members portrayed the movement as a 
career advancer, a sure path towards achieving one’s professional goals in the field of politics, 
business, and education, and as a result, an excellent opportunity to join the nation’s elite.  The 
Komsomol had functioned in the same way, as a recruitment mechanism and the Party’s training 
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ground for future bureaucrats, leaders, and military officials.  With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, however, these formal structures of career mobility in politics and the military were 
subsequently eliminated.  Nashi offered the pro-Putin political party, United Russia, a viable 
platform for training future members and government officials.
117
      
 Because Nashi was a project of the regime, political analysts generally perceived it to be 
a passive instrument of state agenda; however, the language Nashi used on its website to attract 
members implied that it enjoyed a relative amount of freedom from the official party line.  Such 
opportunities for self-accomplishment regardless of one’s social background also dramatically 
heightened Nashi’s appeal, both to the politically minded and the politically uninterested.   
 On the ground level, Nashi drew its members from a variety of backgrounds and 
experiences.  Some of its leaders, called “commissars,” had already been active in their local 
government politics.  Others included self-proclaimed fans of Putin, young aspiring political 
activists, those from remote areas who were rewarded with free dinners and tours of the capital 
by participating in Nashi events in the metropolis, and those who believed Nashi could improve 
their chances of attaining a better level of higher education.  The diversity of its members was 
aptly captured in the 2012 documentary film, Putin’s Kiss, which followed the life of nineteen-
year old Masha Drokova and her experiences as a Nashi member.
118
  Masha had been active in 
Nashi since the age of fifteen, and had quickly advanced within the organization when she 
became the host of a youth-oriented state television program.  As the key spokeswoman for 
Nashi, Masha Drokova and her career in pro-regime youth politics were hardly representative of 
her Russian peers, but she became a symbol of Putin’s power and represented the first generation 
of Russian youths who had not grown up under the Soviet empire for most, if not all, of their 
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lives.  Masha and her generation had come of age in a post-Soviet Russia that coincided with 
Vladimir Putin’s rise to power.  These were the youths who had been born during perestroika 
(1985-1991) years and were of university-age (18-24) by the time political youth movements 
emerged under Putin’s regime.119   
 Members were primarily drawn to Nashi if not by political ambition, like Masha, then to 
receive material rewards such as university scholarships and grants, or in more ideal terms, the 
organization provided youth with an opportunity for self development.  One Nashi leader 
explained, in vague terms, that the reason why he joined Nashi was because he saw the 
movement as a possibility to achieve something real, not only at the regional level, but on a 
global scale.
120
  Nashi appeared to represent a youth movement in which one could be part of the 
“big issues,” while also cultivating one’s own personal development.  Another Nashi leader 
explained that a principal reason he had joined the movement was because the idea of 
“maintaining the country’s sovereignty” around the “orange events” was important to him.121  
Another Nashi member explained that he had joined Nashi because ultimately he viewed his own 
personal success as connected to the state:   
 
Well, we talk that you must gain personal success but it must be linked to the state‘s success. If 
you‘re a successful constructor of airplanes…the country will be glad about that, it will have 
good air-planes, right? You can be a talented artist, doctor, or poet, it doesn‘t matter…but the 
whole society wins. Here I don‘t see any point in separating the country, the state and society. I 
think they all can unite. That‘s what we think about that.122 
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This quote reflects how notions of the official youth policy were compatible with the 
autonomous decisions of the individual members of the movement.  According to Jussi Lassila, it 
demonstrates how “the concept of youth is almost always accompanied with a certain conceptual 
broadening, typically with the state, the country, and the society.”123   
 Confronted with the emergence of a Kremlin-formulated youth movement led by Nashi 
in 2005, a number of existing youth groups began increasing their political activities to 
counteract Nashi’s growing influence among young people.  In mainstream political discourse, 
these alternative youth organizations (irrespective of whether or not they held similar political 
views among themselves) occupied the complete opposite end of the political spectrum.  As 
Valerie Sperling asserts, “in a largely authoritarian regime like Russia’s, where one party 
dominates the political realm and exerts significant efforts to marginalize the opposition, 
political youth organizations are polarized, adopting pro- or anti-regime positions by default.”124  
Hence, the extreme polarization of Russian politics manifested itself in youth politics, whereby 
the political course of the Kremlin came to be understood as the ‘official road’ and all other 
views were collectively dismissed as unofficial and illegitimate by the regime.  This “us” versus 
“them” rhetoric captured headlines in February 2005 when Nashi members discovered that two 
opposition figures had sneaked into the organization’s first training conference held at a hotel 
resort outside of Moscow.  Ilya Yashin, who was twenty-one at the time and the Moscow 
coordinator for the liberal Youth Yabloko group, and his friend Oleg Kashin, a twenty-four year 
old journalist for the newspaper Kommersant, had managed to spend several hours at the 
conference before they were recognized and as Yashin later recalls, were brought out in front of 
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a crowd of about 200 people by Nashi organizers and described as “the very people who Nashi is 
to fight.” 125   Later, Nashi leader Vasily Yakemenko allegedly ordered a handful of Nashi 
participants to take Yashin outside and beat him up.
126
  This incident made it clear that the name 
Nashi was by no means accidental on the part of its creators and that it was meant to imply “Ours” 
as in “Those on Our Side.”127  Those on the other side, or organizations that held alternative 
political views from the Kremlin, comprised a separate youth movement, one that I refer to in 
this thesis as the ‘opposition youth movement.’   
 The most notable and influential organizations in the Kremlin-opposing camp were 
affiliated with major (and in some cases, disenfranchised) opposition political parties.  The major 
groups included Youth Yabloko, the youth wing of the liberal Yabloko Party, which joined 
hands with the small anti-Putin group Idushchiye Bez Putina (“Moving without Putin”) in March 
2005; the youth arm of the Union of Right Forces, otherwise known as the SPS Party (Soyuz 
Pravykh Sil); the Union of Communist Youth under the Communist Party; the National 
Bolshevik Party, a radical left-leaning youth-dominated party led by Eduard Limonov; and the 
youth wing of Rodina, the nationalist ‘Motherland’ party.128  Civic youth organizations, though 
not always explicitly political in their goals, also began amplifying their activities and increasing 
their membership in 2005.  The most prominent civic groups to come out of this period were 
Oborona (“Defense”) and Da! (“Yes!”).    Collectively, these youth organizations shared a 
common opposition towards the Kremlin’s attempts to preserve the status quo, but beyond that 
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they struggled to form a cohesive movement against Nashi and its related pro-Kremlin youth 
groups.    
 In Reuven Kahane’s work on the origins of postmodern youth, he describes how the 
concept of youth has evolved over the last century from an “immature, hot-blooded, heavily 
controlled group, to an autonomous entity, to an informal authentic culture.” 129   This new 
authenticity was based on a new code of behavior – the code of informality, a “symbolic and 
behavioral construct with which individuals or groups strive to maximize what they perceive as 
their genuine self-expression.”130  The National Bolshevik Party (NBP), the youth-dominated 
political party that was led by Eduard Limonov, embodied this informal authentic culture by 
being “one of the most scandalous, controversial, but also aesthetically well-known youth 
movements in post-Soviet Russia.”131  The NBP’s favorite tactics against people they considered 
symbols of the regime were “throwing mayonnaise or tomatoes at prominent public figures.”132  
In August 2004, a group of NBP activists protested the unpopular social-benefits reforms by 
breaking into the office of Health and Social Development Minister Mikhail Zurabov and 
demanding his resignation for his part in enacting the reforms.  Later that year, thirty-nine 
members of NBP were arrested after occupying the presidential administration visitors’ room to 
protest Putin’s political reforms.133  The NBP’s extremist ultranationalist propaganda and actions 
has made it impossible for the group to be officially registered as a political party in Russia.  In a 
Supreme Court decision in 2005, the government banned the NBP “on the grounds that it had 
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violated the law on political parties by calling itself a "party" without having official 
registration.”134  It was clear, however, that the ban was a pretext for the government to continue 
excluding the NBP from official politics.   
 Another group to oppose Nashi was Youth Yabloko, the youth wing of the pro-Western, 
liberal party "Yabloko.”  In February 2005, Youth Yabloko made a pact with Idushchie Bez 
Putina to oppose what they perceived to be Putin’s growing “authoritarian political regime” by 
forming a student protest movement.
135
  Ilya Yashin, the leader of Youth Yabloko, declared that 
the two movements would form a “vanguard of social opposition to Putin's regime.”136  Together 
with the youth division of the Union of Right Forces, they held a rally in Moscow on March 8, 
2005 to protest the new federal law that would replace the election of regional governors with 
Kremlin appointments.
137
    
 In spite of growing opposition, Nashi remained a powerful mobilization tool for the 
Kremlin.  In the summer of 2005, nearly five thousand people, from ages 18 to 30, convened at 
Lake Seliger in Central Russia for the inaugural of a Nashi-sponsored summer camp.  Over the 
course of three weeks, participants attended lectures on business and politics and met with top 
officials in Putin’s administration.  By 2009, the annual camp event drew tens of thousands of 
participants and in 2011 invited international students to participate for the first time.   
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Participants at Nashi’s Camp Seliger standing in rows in order to illustrate 




 The annual summer camp at Lake Seliger effectively served as the training grounds for 
pro-Kremlin youth movements; there, participants got to learn about ‘President Putin’s domestic 
policies’ and ‘President Putin’s ideology’.  Daily activities and events were centered on instilling 
values of patriotism as participants awoke each morning to the sound of the Soviet anthem 
playing over the loud speakers.  Throughout the day, participants attended lectures, conferences, 
meetings, and training sessions.  In the afternoon, they were expected to work on their individual 
business projects.
 
 The purpose of Seliger, according to the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, 
which began sponsoring the camp in 2010, was to “help young people kick-start their careers by 
providing them with the support and contacts necessary to realize their business or social 
projects.”139  Seliger participants were encouraged to work on their social or business project by 
networking with peers, speaking with representatives of some of Russia’s largest corporations, 
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and finding business sponsors of investors to fund their projects.  However, most camp 
participants did not have their own projects and seldom did the camp actually cultivate an 
entrepreneurial environment.  The main purpose of the camp, made explicit by larger than life 
photos of Putin and inspiring phrases by Kremlin leaders that overpowered the tents throughout 
the camp, was to respond to Putin’s call for greater national identity among Russians.  The 
camp’s rather blatant promotion of Putin made it clear that the Russian national identity was 
intrinsically tied to Putin himself.  Regional commissars, or leaders within the Nashi 
organization, were encouraged to become well-educated on the regime’s politics and ideology, as 
well as engage in debates on ways in which the movement’s programs could be carried out.  
Groups of commissars from various regions gathered for discussions that ranged from “USA – 
Ally or Enemy?” to “Should the Nashi movement become a political party?”140  Camp Seliger, at 
least in its initial framework, was intended to form a vanguard of the most dedicated youth.   
 Moreover, the annual summer event allowed the state to address Russia’s demographic 
crisis.  According to preliminary results of the 2010 census, the Russian population had dropped 
by 2.2 million to 142.9 million since the last census in 2002.
141
  Nashi explicitly endorsed 
procreation at Camp Seliger by setting up “couple tents.”  After exchanging vows in a group 
wedding ceremony on stage in front of all the camp’s participants, twenty couples were assigned 
red-colored tents adorned with heart balloons.
142  
Nashi leaders began wearing T-shirts with 
slogans such as “The health ministry advises: reproduction is good for your health,” “I want to 
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have three children,” and “I am the start of a demographic boom.”143  The message for Russia’s 
youth was clear: procreation was the proper duty of a loyal citizen of the state.  Implicit, also, 
was the notion that behavior which did not lead to procreation, such as abortion and 
homosexuality, would be seen as moral violations against the state.  Hence, activities at Camp 
Seliger were closely monitored and purposefully directed towards promoting state-approved 
values.       
  Prior to the establishment of Camp Seliger, the Kremlin’s support for Nashi had been 
common knowledge.  However, with the institution of the annual summer camp, the close 
relationship between the regime and the youth movement became unquestionable.  The 
Kremlin’s fundraising efforts had made it possible to fund such large events as Seliger and 
Vasily Yakemenko alluded to this fact when he boasted: “The support of the Kremlin makes it 
possible to speak with any businessman and get financial support.  To refuse to finance our 
project is a manifestation of an unpatriotic position.”144  Therefore, the patriotism rhetoric also 
applied to businesses, implying that unless corporations endorsed the Kremlin’s projects (i.e. 
Nashi) financially, they would not have the protection of the state.  Kremlin-backing thereby 
enabled Nashi to mobilize young people and organize events on a large scale more efficiently 
than other youth groups.  Yet, dependence on the Kremlin and its sponsors to endorse Nashi’s 
major projects ultimately proved detrimental to the movement as it meant that its existence 
would be subject to the regime’s political whims rather than a genuine social movement with 
action being generated from participants themselves.      
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 In addition to Camp Seliger, Nashi also participated in street protests against individuals 
and groups that the movement considered anti-Putin or that were known to have ties to the West.  
In the summer of 2006, after British Ambassador Anthony Brenton spoke at a conference 
organized by “Other Russia,” an opposition party, Nashi activists set a staged protest in front of 
the British embassy in Moscow.  The Nashi activists demanded an apology from the ambassador, 
claiming that he had broken international law by interfering in Russia’s internal affairs.145  They 
also accused the ambassador of promising to give Other Russia over $2 million dollars to fund its 
political agenda.  In a letter to Queen Elizabeth II, Nashi leaders urged Her Majesty to fire 
Brenton on the grounds that he had “wasted British taxpayers’ money.”146  For four months, 
Nashi activists followed Ambassador Brenton around Moscow, heckling him at public 
appearances and standing in front of the British embassy holding the red and white Nashi flag 
with posters featuring Brenton’s face with the word ‘Loser’ written on them.  In December 2006, 
the ambassador publicly denounced the group for “stalking” him.147  
 By refusing to order Nashi activists to end their picketing, the Kremlin had tacitly 
approved the harassment of Brenton, so the government’s silence on the matter encouraged 
youth activists to continue putting pressure on the ambassador and the British government.  In 
remaining silent, the government had also avoided taking full responsibility for the group’s 
actions.  It was clear nevertheless that orders had been coming from the Kremlin directly to 
Nashi activists; it was the only way Ambassador Brenton could explain how the youth activists 
knew where to find him every day for four months, sometimes even showing up before him at 
the spot of his next appointment.    
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 On the one hand, the Brenton case appeared to demonstrate the way in which Nashi had 
become a political tool employed by the Kremlin to punish officials publicly for actions deemed 
anti-Kremlin.  Yet, on the other, it exemplified how youth politics could often go beyond the 
recommended measures of the regime and consequently, generate potential problems for 
Russia’s domestic and foreign politics.   
 Russia’s youth movements had also played a central role in escalating tensions between 
Russia and Estonia.  In 2007, Nashi activists targeted Estonia after the Estonian government 
relocated a Soviet-era World War Two memorial from the capital, Tallinn, to a nearby military 
cemetery.   Many Estonians had viewed the statue as a symbol of Soviet occupation, while for 
many Russians both in Russia and in Estonia the statue recalled Soviet triumph over the 
Germans in the Great Patriotic War.  Thus, the removal of the statue provoked anger both in 
Tallinn and Moscow.  In April and May 2007, members of Nashi camped outside the Estonian 
Embassy in Moscow to protest the decision.  Once again, the same tactics used to intimidate 
Ambassador Brenton in 2006 were used against the Estonian ambassador to Russia.  In one 
incident, security officials at the Estonian embassy were forced to use tear gas to disperse the 
crowd of Nashi activists who had stormed a press conference held by the Estonian ambassador.  
Shortly after, Estonia accused Russia of “violating the Vienna Convention on diplomatic 
relations for failing to protect its diplomats in Moscow.”148   
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Bronze statue of the Unknown Soldier at the center of the 





 The row between Russia and Estonia over the removal of the Soviet monument in Tallinn 
carried over to cyberspace.  From 27 April to 18 May 2007, cyber attacks targeted Estonian state 
(and some private) websites with denial-of-service messages that forced many government, 
business, and political party websites in Estonia to shut down completely.
150
  The cyber attacks 
had severely impacted the Internet-dependent country of Estonia, where 60 percent of the 
population in 2007 used the Internet on a daily basis.
151
  Although the hacking could not be 
directly traced to a single or a collective group of individuals, it was widely known that the cyber 
attacks had been launched out of Russia.         
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 The combined actions by Nashi and the hackers in response to the removal of the bronze 
statue led to deteriorating bilateral relations between Russia and Estonia.  Estonia barred 
hundreds of Nashi activists from entering Estonia, and because Estonia was also part of the 
Schengen zone, effectively barred them from most of Europe.  Nashi’s leader Nikita Borovikov 
challenged the Estonian government’s response and told followers: 
 
Let them forbid us entry into the European Union.  We will not give up the memory of our 
ancestors, nor will we give up our history and, thanks to this, thanks to the unity of the whole 





 Despite Borovikov’s conviction that Nashi’s actions against the Estonian government 
were legitimated by history, the incident had dampened relations between the movement and the 
Kremlin.  According to political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky, “When Europe started denying 
Schengen visas to Nashi activists, all this started to look like playing with fire. After all, Russia 
would have had to make a symmetric response. And doing so would not be advantageous for 
Russia.”153  Thus, the movement’s actions were gradually seen as getting to be out of control, 
much to the point where they posed a threat to the Kremlin’s foreign and domestic image.      
 As Putin prepared to step down in 2008 in accordance with the Russian Constitution’s 
two-term limit, the announcement of Putin’s hand-picked successor Dmitry Medvedev raised 
questions about the future of Nashi and other similar pro-Kremlin youth groups.  It was deemed 
at the time that another youth movement centered on Medvedev was superfluous and that the 
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threat of another Orange Revolution had abated.  In early 2008, Nashi leader Nikita Borovikov 
announced a radical reorganization of the group; the former fifty regional branches were reduced 
to five, those in Vladimir, Ivanovo, Tula, Voronezh, and Yaroslavl.
154
  The dramatic reduction of 
Nashi’s regional branches signaled the declining role of state endorsement in political youth 
movements in Russia. 
 Hence, the combined result of a diminished Orange threat and an increasingly aggressive 
Nashi led the government to shrink its Nashi operations significantly in 2008.  The sequence of 
events that followed Medvedev’s presidential inauguration, however, was far from spelling the 
end of Nashi; in the words of opposition leader and Young Yabloko leader, Il’ya Yashin, Nashi 
was a “very expensive electoral toy” that will be “put on ice [after the election] so that it can be 
reanimated in case of an emergency.”155  As long as the regime experienced relatively stable 
politics, it was assumed that Nashi would play a far less conspicuous and active role in Kremlin 
politics than it had during its first three years.     












                                                 
154
 “Nashi to be Reorganized,” Kommersant, Janurary 29, 2008, 
http://kommersant.com/p846635/political_youth_groups/. 
155
 Maya Atwal, “Evaluating Nashi’s Sustainability: Autonomy, Agency and Activism,” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 
5 (July 2009): 745. 










“There is no longer a threat of an 'orange revolution,' so we can concentrate on other things.  
But we will not disappear.  
We have simply outgrown our short pants.”156 
 




 In 2007, Nashi underwent its first major leadership change when its founder Vasily 
Yakemenko announced that he would step down as Nashi’s leader to become head of the Federal 
Agency on Youth Affairs.
157
  Nikita Borovikov, formerly a Nashi commissar and law student 
from Vladimir, became the next leader for Nashi.  While Nashi’s leadership had ostensibly 
changed, Yakemenko continued to remain deeply involved in its activities as was seen by his 
continuing attendance at Camp Seliger in 2009 and other Nashi-related events.  Despite media 
speculations that Nashi’s future was doomed with Yakemenko’s departure, his promotion gave 
him substantially more clout to determine the movement’s future.158  On July 24, 2007, a few 
days after his public announcement, Yakemenko, joined by sixty-five pro-Kremlin youth 
activists from Nashi, Mestnye (“Locals”), Young Guard, Young Russia, New People, and Our 
Country, met Putin at the Zavidovo residence of the President to discuss the next phases of the 
youth movement.  According to the Russian news source, ITAR-TASS, Yakemenko had allegedly 
proposed to Putin the possibility of uniting pro-Kremlin youth organizations and creating a 
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political committee dedicated to youth policy, to all of which Putin had supposedly replied: 
“Establishing a single center for youth management — I think that's in the past.  Instead, the state 
should create conditions that enable young people to achieve their potential — in careers, private 
life, culture, and politics.”159  Putin’s response was illuminating in multiple respects: first, he 
rejected the centralization of pro-regime youth organizations as an unachievable idea from the 
past; second, he reinforced the idea of the state’s intrinsic role in providing socio-political 
conditions for young people, particularly those who supported the regime, that would improve 
their lives; and third, his response provided no concrete objectives for the youth groups that were 
represented.  However, Putin’s response seemed to imply that the Kremlin wanted to shift 
Nashi’s emphasis away from politics.              
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 Moreover, Nashi proved to be a sizable political and financial investment for the Kremlin. 
At Nashi’s annual summer camp in Lake Seliger in July 2008, fewer than 5,000 participants 
attended, or half as many as had attended the previous camp in 2007.
161
  Moreover, the blatant 
absence of high-profile Kremlin figures in comparison to previous years seemed to confirm 
earlier media speculations of Nashi’s post-electoral downfall.”162  This led to rumors that the 
youth movement was becoming outdated and that it was not only struggling to recruit new 
members, but also losing state support.  Such reasoning assumed that Nashi was almost 
completely dependent on the state to the extent that it acted primarily as an extension of the state.   
 A number of recent scholarly works, however, have refuted this interpretation of the 
relationship between organized youth activists and the state.  In her evaluation of Nashi, Maya 
Atwal contended in 2009 that “despite the movement’s allegiance to the incumbent regime and 
its utilization of state resources, Nashi activists have become increasingly politically autonomous 
and therefore capable of sustaining the movement in their own right.”163  Atwal’s perspective 
addressed the dual issues of autonomy and agency among Nashi activists.  The political 
transition in 2008 served as a moment of truth for Nashi.  No longer with Putin as president, 
whose personal backing of Nashi had lent tremendous power and legitimacy to the group since it 
was founded in 2005, and faced with the possibility of losing state protection in the form of 
financing and political support, the future of Nashi looked uncertain.  For these reasons, 
Medvedev’s term from 2008 to 2012 would see changes within Nashi that would determine the 
limits of its potential to sustain itself without direct state support.
164
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 By 2008, however, the reasons that had served to create and sustain state-endorsed youth 
movements were no longer operable.  For one, the threat of an Orange Revolution was virtually 
nonexistent.  The absent threat of a colored revolution implied that the government no longer 
needed an ‘anti-orange’ force at command.  Therefore Nashi and several other pro-Kremlin 
youth movements, which had been largely created out of the events of 2006, found themselves at 
a crucial turning point in the development of modern youth movements in Russia.  And 
furthermore, Nashi had begun to operate largely and conspicuously as a representative of the 
Kremlin on foreign policy issues, showcased by Nashi activists when they exerted pressure on 
the British ambassador and picketed the Estonian Embassy in 2007.  The need for a restructuring 
of the Kremlin’s original designs for its sponsored youth organizations became all too clear by 
the 2008 presidential election cycle.  The consequence of Putin stepping down as president 
raised doubts as to whether the next president would have the sort of popular appeal that Putin 
had enjoyed among the youth, and whether Dmitry Medvedev would receive the continuing 
support of young people.    
 The year 2008 proved to be a transformative year for Russia’s internal and external 
politics.  Dmitry Medvedev was elected President of Russia in May and appointed his mentor, 
Putin, as Prime Minister, enabling Putin to remain in power while circumventing the 
Constitution’s two-term presidential limit.  The Putin-Medvedev tandem of 2008-2012 was such 
that, while Medvedev had occupied an important role in the Putin era, he was never meant to be 
an alternative power figure to Putin, in accordance with the agreement they had made prior to the  






  Hence, a salient feature of the Medvedev presidency was the way in which the 
power structure continued to revolve around Vladimir Putin who, despite his new post as prime 
minister, remained the dominant power-broker in the Kremlin.   
  In 2009, Medvedev launched a nation-wide initiative aimed at modernizing Russia’s 
economy and society by decreasing Russia’s dependence on oil and gas revenues and 
establishing a new economy based on improved technology and innovation.
 166
  In an article 
published online titled “Go Russia!”, Medvedev outlined the need for Russia as a democratic 
nation to “cultivate a taste for the rule of law, for abiding by the law, respect for the rights of 
others, including such important rights as that of property ownership.”167  For Nashi and similar 
pro-Kremlin youth movements, Medvedev’s emphasis on the ‘rule of law’ and protecting the 
rights and freedoms of individuals appeared to contradict a number of their activities.   
 Given that his presidential slogan emphasized modernization, Medvedev was keen to tap 
into the potential of the country’s youth, particularly in the sciences and in technology.  He 
declared 2009 the Year of the Youth in Russia, calling various government bodies to focus “on 
supporting youth initiatives and ensuring the capacities of the young people.”  He posited that in 
other countries youth played a vital role in advancing scientific innovation, and indicated that 
Russia was moving in a similar direction by his establishment of a Presidential Award for young 
scientists, which offered a “sizable award worth 2.5 million rubles each [approximately 80 
thousand dollars]” and increasing presidential grants for young PhD and D. Sc. Degree 
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  Then he applauded the efforts of a Youth Innovation Convention that was held for 
the first time in Russia and suggested that the group focus on developing at the regional level as 
well, so as to form “regional young scientists and specialists’ councils.”169   The emphasis on 
science then shifted to politics, in which Medvedev offered the following proposal on youth 
voting age: “I am proposing that we establish a single age requirement in every constituent entity 
for candidates in municipal government elections. I think that any citizen who has reached the 
age of 18 should be granted the right and opportunity to be elected to a municipal 
government.”170  With proposals such as these, Medvedev made it clear that youth policy would 
be a priority during his presidency, but one markedly different from his predecessor’s. 
 In October 2009, Nashi activists picketed outside the home of journalist and human rights 
activist Alexander Podrabinek after he published an article that criticized the Moscow Union of 
Veterans. In the article, Podrabinek had suggested that the veterans group’s members were 
former “camp guards” and “executioners” for demanding that a Moscow restaurant change its 
name from Antisovetskaya, or Anti-Soviet, to Sovetskaya, or Soviet.
 171
   Soon after the article 
was published, Nashi activists, dressed in their trademark red jackets and accompanied by nearly 
a hundred veterans, protested outside of the journalist’s home, carrying World War II symbols 
and posters that read, “The freedom of the press doesn’t mean lawlessness in journalism.”172   
The protests against journalist Podrabinek drew warnings from the government.  The Presidential 
Council on Civil Society and Human Rights, a group of advisers convened by Medvedev to 
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address human rights issues, stated that Nashi had violated Articles 23, 24, 25, 27, and 29 of the 
Constitution.  The articles, among other things, guarantee: “the inviolability of personal life and 
home; that a citizen’s personal information will not be spread without his consent; the right to 
choose one’s residence; and the rights to freedom of thought and conscience, including a 
freedom from pressure to retract or alter one’s beliefs.” 173   The Council went further by 
expressing “its deep regret and disturbance over Nashi’s actions, which not only recall the 
shameful Soviet persecution campaigns against dissenters. … They also give Russia’s young 
people an unabashed example of legal nihilism,” using the same term that President Medvedev 
had used to describe a widespread disregard for the law.
174
  The Podrabinek incident thus 
illustrated the changed relationship between Nashi and the government under Medvedev; rather 
than defending or endorsing Nashi’s actions as it had previously done before under Putin, the 
government, in this case the Presidential Council on Civil Society and Human Rights, 
condemned Nashi on the grounds that its members acted unlawfully.     
 As a sign of the Kremlin’s diminishing support for Nashi, Camp Seliger in 2009 became 
the first year that Nashi was not the main organizer and sponsor of the camp.  The Federal 
Ministry of Sport, Tourism, and Youth replaced Nashi as the direct sponsor of Camp Seliger.   
Conforming to the theme of the “Year of the Youth,” Seliger 2009 promoted business and 
innovation noticeably more so than patriotism and nationalism.  A series of week-long seminars 
included themes on leadership, business, and volunteerism. The following summer at Camp 
Seliger proved to be much more controversial when another pro-Kremlin youth group called Stal 
(“Steel”) set up wooden stakes with puppet heads displaying faces of prominent state officials, 
including Hillary Clinton, Condoleeza Rice, and five judges of the European Court for Human 









Rights, all adorned with military hats bearing Nazi swastikas.  One of the camp directors, Ilya 
Kostunov, justified the puppet head exhibit declaring that “the persons depicted on the boards 
must think about why they draw such a reaction on the part of the youth movement.”175  The 
puppet head exhibit, however, drew wide criticism both from within and outside of Russia, and 
led to a number of Seliger sponsors, including German auto maker Mercedes-Benz, to withdraw 
their endorsements.  As a result, Seliger became largely discredited as a radical, extremist youth 
camp.   
  
 




 Yet, the watershed for the regime and for Nashi happened after September 2011, when 
Prime Minister Putin announced that he and Medvedev had agreed to switch roles as president 
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and prime minister “a long time ago, several years back.”177  The so-called “swap” angered many 
Russians who felted cheated of their democratic rights.  Prompted by the parliamentary elections 
of December 4
th
, 2011, tens of thousands took to the streets to protest the return of Putin as 
president and the ruling party, United Russia, famously coined the “party of crooks and thieves” 
by opposition blogger, Alexei Navalny.
178
  Thus, in the months preceding the March 2012 
presidential election, which Putin had won, the largest demonstrations took place in Moscow 
since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.  The 2011-2012 protests in Russia demonstrated the 
growing discontent among Russians, especially within the middle-class, towards Putin’s political 
system.     
 As early as April 2012, a month after Putin was elected president, the Russian online 
news source Gazeta.ru reported that Nashi founder Vasily Yakemenko had met with Nashi’s 
four Commissars, Maria Kislitsina, Artur Omarov, Aleksander Gagiev, and Sergei Blintsov, and 
told them that Nashi would be “disbanded” and that “the history of Nashi in the present form is 
over.” 179   The news was immediately dismissed as an unfounded “rumor” by Nashi’s 
spokeswoman, Kristina Potupchik, who in her LiveJournal blog wrote: “Nashi will not simply 
continue to exist, but will also birth new projects which will remain within the framework of the 
movement.”180  Media speculation that the Kremlin had dissolved Nashi was further fueled by 
Yakemenko’s announcement the following month in May that he would be launching a new 
political party called the “Party of Power,” designed to attract the young, disaffected, middle-
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class voters who were drawn to the opposition protests from earlier that year.
181
  According to 
Yakemenko, the party aimed to replace the ruling United Russia party and to target middle-class 
people between the ages of 25 and 35 who “have their own opinions” and “don’t want important 
decisions in the country’s life to be made without them.”182  Upon learning of the Kremlin’s next 
project, political analysts predicted that Yakemenko’s project would fail, citing the Kremlin’s 
already tarnished image.
183
   Yet, Yakemenko’s motive behind establishing the “Party of Power” 
was illuminating in multiple respects: first, it highlighted the Kremlin’s concerns about potential 
and ongoing unrest prompted by the mass demonstrations.  Second, it identified a specific group 
of citizens whose anti-regime stance was troubling for the Kremlin, and finally, the motive 
behind this new party was to shift the emphasis away from state-organized movements to 
political parties.    
 For Nashi, the mass protests spelled out what appeared to be yet another new phase for 
the movement.  On February 13, 2013, the Russian daily newspaper Izvestia reported that Nashi 
would split into several projects under the new name, the All-Russian Youth Society.
184
   A 
Nashi spokesperson confirmed the news, saying that the name “Nashi” would remain for the 
time being, but that the “logic would change” and the group would expand geographically and 
broaden the scope of its activities.
185
  The projects would address specific social issues: 
Stopkham (“Stop Boorishness”) would target poor behavior on Russia’s roads, Khryushi Protiv 
(“Piglets Agsinst”) would go after expired produce on grocery store shelves, and Begi Za Mnoi 
(“Run After Me”) would promote healthy lifestyles.  In this manner, the Kremlin had ostensibly 
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shifted the focus of Nashi from a political youth movement to youth activism based on social 









































   
 In Russia, where political youth movements have had an entrenched history since the 
Soviet period, the emergence of Idushchie Vmeste in 2000 and Nashi in 2005 marked a changing 
relationship between the government and the nation’s youth.  While both organizations borrowed 
several of their concepts and practices from their long-lived predecessor, the Komsomol, they 
each demonstrated a distinct form of public political participation in the post-Soviet era.  
 The youth-led Orange Revolution in Ukraine prompted Putin’s government to artificially 
create a movement consisting of young, unquestioning supporters who would serve as a 
counteracting force against anti-Kremlin threats.  In doing so, the Kremlin had attempted to 
control and legitimize youth participation in the public sphere.  By instilling state-associated 
values of patriotism, nationalism, and modernization through participation at Camp Seliger and 
other organized events, the Kremlin had crafted its own weapon to fight real and imagined 
enemies of the state.   
 State-sponsored youth politics in Russia was “not the politics of columned halls and 
boardrooms, but politics of the street.”186  Strategically coordinated and designed by the Kremlin, 
the activities of its youth groups helped extend its arm in places where it would not be able to 
reach otherwise.  This particular arrangement between the Kremlin and its young supporters 
provided a channel for formal politics to operate outside of normal boundaries, and as a result, a 
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segment of Russian youths had not only become political but also became politicized themselves 
through their association with the Kremlin. 
 The formation of Russia’s state-founded patriotic youth organizations was intimately 
linked to the personal figure and leadership of Vladimir Putin.  As a KGB agent based in East 
Germany when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, Putin had personally witnessed the collapse of the 
Soviet empire.  As people took to the streets, Putin had allegedly stood outside the KGB quarters 
in Dresden with a pistol, resisting a crowd of street protesters who were attempting to storm the 
building.
187
   When he called the local Soviet army barracks for help, he was told: “We cannot do 
anything without orders from Moscow. And Moscow is silent.”188   The silence of Moscow 
undoubtedly perturbed Putin, for to him it had confirmed that the Soviet Union no longer existed 
and that it had “disappeared.”  Lucian Kim, a journalist who writes about Putin’s Russia, asserted 
that Putin’s experience in Dresden during the fall of the Berlin Wall “went a long way in 
explaining his aversion to street politics and his messianic belief that only he can save Russia.”189  
For Putin, after witnessing the fall of the Berlin Wall, the greatest disappointment was that no 
successful alternative to the collapse of the Soviet Union was considered in time to prevent the 
empire from dissolving.  Putin expressed this sentiment years later in his 2005 State of the Union 
address: “The collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 
century.”190  In their recent book, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, Fiona Hill and Clifford 
Gaddy assert that contrary to the general public’s interpretation of Putin’s statement, he was not 
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